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Hatton v. Falcon Coal: Breach of
Contract or Trespass to Realty?
INTRODUCTION
The surface mining of coal remains a controversial business
activity in Kentucky.' Disputes often arise between the owners
of the surface estate and the severed mineral estate concerning
the interpretation of the mineral severance deed. 2 In a recent
Kentucky case, surface owners argued that an exception of cer-
tain types and diameters of trees, explicit within two mineral
severance deeds, contractually prohibited any surface mining.
The defendant mining company argued that the surface owner's
claim was time barred3 since the true cause of action was a
trespass to real property rather than a breach of contract. This
Comment considers the resolution of this issue by the Kentucky
Court of Appeals.
I. HATTON V. FALCON COAL Co.
In Hatton v. Falcon Coal Company,4 the Kentucky Court
of Appeals confronted a conflict regarding the application5 of
two statutes of limitation, one pertaining to trespass claims and
I See Comment, Akers v. Baldwin: The Broad Form Deed Dilemma Revisited, 4
J. MIN. L. & PoL'y 213 (1988)(A historical overview of the broad form deed controversy
and its judicial history is given along with the future impacts of the Akers, 736 S.W.2d
294 (Ky. 1987) holding).
2 The right to sever the mineral estate from the surface estate has been established
for a long time. See Kincaid v. McGowan, 4 S.W. 802 (Ky. 1887).
1 Courts have recognized that legislative policies regarding the establishment of
statutes of limitation are controlling. 51 AM. JuR.2D Limitation of Actions § 5 (1970);
54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 2 (1987); see Liter v. Hoagland, 204 S.W.2d 219
(Ky. 1947)(the Court indicated that the bringing of suits on stale claims is prohibited by
the statute of limitation). Basically, a statute of limitation "[prescribes] limitations to
the right of action on certain described causes of action . . . unless brought within a
specified period of time after the right accrued. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 835
(5th ed. 1979).
4 734 S.W.2d 806 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987).
E.g., Annotation, Choice of Law as to Applicable Statute of Limitations in
Contract Actions. 78 A.L.R.3D 639 (1977).
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the other relating to contractual claims. The action arose from
a violation of terms within a mineral severance deed.6 The case
originated from a lower court7 where a special judge8 ruled by
summary judgment that the appellant's cause of action was time
barred by the five-year statute of limitations for a trespass
action. 9 The Kentucky Court of Appeals overturned the judg-
ment, holding that the fifteen-year limitation period for a breach
of contract'0 governed the breach of express terms within a
mineral severance deed and not the five-year limitation period
of a trespass action."
The cause of action arose from Falcon Coal Company's'
2
strip mining of property'3 whose surface was owned by the
appellants. 14 Falcon Coal commenced strip mining the Hatton
property in 1971 and ceased its operations in the summer of
1973.11 Ten years later, in 1983,16 the owners of the surface
estate initiated an action based on a breach of the express
terms of the original mineral severance deed 17 which prohibited
6 Hatton, 734 S.W.2d at 806.
Id.
8 "Some five (5) special judges were assigned at various times to hear [the] case
before [being settled by] the Honorable Caswell P. Lone." Appellant's Brief at 3,
Hatton, 734 S.W.2d 806.
9 Hatton, 734 S.W.2d at 806.
11 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. 413.090 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1972) [hereinafter KRSJ
provides that "the following actions shall be commenced within fifteen (15) years after
the cause of action first accrued ... (2) [a]n action upon recognizance, bond or written
contract .... "
1 KRS 413.120 provides that "the following actions shall be commenced within
five (5) years after the cause of action accrued . . . (4) [a]n action for trespass on real
or personal property .... 1"
12 Falcon Coal Company (appellee) was strip mining under a lease agreement with
Kycoga Company (appellee), the mineral estate owner. See Hatton, 734 S.W.2d at 806.
" The property consisted of two tracts located in Breathitt County. The mineral
severance conveyed by Abijah and Miranda White to Arthur Bright contained 72.33
acres while the mineral severance conveyed by John White to Bright contained 105 acres.
The price paid for the two mineral severance deeds was $26.16 and $49.17 respectively.
Appellant's Brief at Appendices A and B, Hatton, 734 S.W.2d 806.
," Appellant property owners were: Nancy Hatton, Bertha Deaton, Mary Stotts,
Martha Helton, Anna White, Evelyn White, Gary White, Donald White and Wayne
White. See Hatton, 734 S.W.2d at 806.
's Hatton, 734 S.W.2d at 806.
16 Appellant's Brief at 1, Hatton, 734 S.W.2d 806.
' The severance of mineral rights from the lands in question occurred in 1889
before the onset of modern day strip mining. Abijah and Miranda White owned one
tract and John White owned the other. The Whites relinquished their rights to the coal,
gases, saltwater and other minerals through a mineral severance deed to Arthur D.
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the taking of any trees exceeding fourteen inches in diameter."
Hatton claimed a breach of contract on the theory that the
mineral severance deed, upon acceptance, constituted a con-
tract.' 9 The present deed contained the same timber restrictions.
20
Consequently, Falcon Coal had no claim to the excepted timber
since deed restrictions run with the land. 2' Even with the explicit
and unambiguous restrictions in place, Falcon Coal strip mined
the lands, giving rise to this suit for damages.
22
II. TRESPASS AS A CAUSE OF ACTION
Hatton did not bring suit until ten years after Falcon Coal
had ceased strip mining. 23 Thus, Falcon Coal argued vehemently
that the five-year statute of limitations applied since the appro-
priate cause of action was a trespass to real property.24 The
Hatton court rejected this argument, establishing Falcon Coal's
Bright. Abijah and Miranda White's deed to Bright stated in part:
Together with the full and complete rights and privileges of every kind for
mining, manufacturing and transporting such Coal, Gases, Saltwater, Oil,
and Minerals on, through and over said premises. And also with full rights
of way to, from and over said premises by the construction and use of
roads, tramways, railroads or otherwise, for the purpose of extracting,
storing, handling, manufacturing, refining, shipping or transporting all
said Minerals, whether contained on the said premises or elsewhere, right
to take and use all timber (except walnut and poplar), under 14 inches in
diameter, found on said premises required for any of the above purposes;
Hatton, 734 S.W.2d at 806.
John White's deed exhibited the same provisions except that Bright was prohibited
from taking timber 15 or more inches in diameter.
Kycoga acquired the mineral rights from Bright and subsequently leased those
rights to Falcon Coal. Hatton, 734 S.W.2d at 806.
" Id.
,9 Hatton, 734 S.W.2d at 807. See McFarland v. Hanley, 258 S.W.2d 3 (Ky.
1953)(restrictions concerning construction of dwellings contained in the deed will be
given meaning and effect).
See supra note 17.
2' Glenmore Distilleries Co. v. Fiorella, 117 S.W.2d 173 (Ky. 1938)(where grantor's
provision in deed restricting changes that would affect insurance rates of fixtures on
adjoining land in property conveyed found to be a covenant running with the land). See
also Rieger v. Wessel, 319 S.W.2d 855 (Ky. 1958); McFarland, 258 S.W.2d 3. But see
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. I (1948)(Supreme Court held that a restrictive covenant
prohibiting ownership by non-Caucasians was unenforceable under the U.S. Constitu-
tion).
. Hatton, 734 S.W.2d at 807.
23 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
2 Hatton, 734 S.W.2d at 807.
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legal right to be on the property under the mineral severance
deed .25
A trespass can occur whether the act was intentional or
unintentional. 26 Furthermore, a trespasser is one who commits
an unlawful act, or a lawful act in an unlawful manner, to the
injury of the person or the property of another. 27 In Hatton, an
injury, destruction of excepted timber, occurred to Hatton's
property from Falcon Coal's strip mining. Thus, a trespass
28
would lie if Falcon Coal performed a lawful act in an unlawful
manner. 29 To avoid the longer statute of limitations for a breach
of contract Falcon Coal focused on whether it had a right to
conduct strip mining operations on the property, under a trespass
theory, which would be time barred under the shorter statute of
limitation period.30 Falcon Coal, however, did not qualify as the
typical trespasser, who illegally enters upon the land in posses-
sion of another without the possessor's consent.' The
reservations3 2 within the deed in question did not prohibit min-
ing.33 Accordingly, Falcon Coal's entry on the land did not
constitute a trespass.
34
Generally, a mineral owner or a lessee has a right to use the
surface estate under a deed or lease agreement. 35 Falcon Coal,
25 Id.
2 Hammonds v. Ingram Industries, Inc., 716 F.2d 365, 371 (6th Cir. 1983). See
Lebow v. Cameron, 394 S.W.2d 773 (Ky. 1965); Rudy v. Ellis, 236 S.W.2d 466 (Ky.
1951).
87 C.J.S. Trespass § 1 (1954).
A person must be in actual or constructive possession of the land upon which
the trespass was committed in order to maintain a trespass action. Ellis v. Beech Creek
Coal Co., 467 S.W.2d 132, 133 (Ky. 1971); Bowman v. Hibbard, 236 S.W.2d 938 (Ky.
1951). Thus, the surface owners had a viable argument for a trespass action but for the
expiration of the five year statute of limitation for such actions.
29 See supra note 27.
30 Hatton, 734 S.W.2d at 807. See Brief for Appellee, Falcon Coal at 4, Hatton,
734 S.W.2d 806. "The Appellants are attempting to turn a simple trespass case into a
'broad form' deed case." Id.
1, Bradford v. Clifton, 379 S.W.2d 249, 250 (Ky. 1964). See Fletcher Lumber Co.
v. Fordson Coal Co., 223 S.W.2d 175 (Ky. 1949). Cf. Mid-America Terminal of
Kentucky, Inc. v. Owensboro River Sand & Gravel Co., 532 S.W.2d 437 (Ky. 1976)
(where separate estate in sand and gravel existed on same land, dredging adjacent to
and construction of structures on land by the owner did not constitute ordinary trespass).
32 The two reservations were: (1) coventor reserved all walnut and poplar timber,
and (2) coventee's right to use timber was restrained to trees less than 15 inches in
diameter. See supra note 17.
3 Hatton, 734 S.W.2d at 806.
3' Hatton, 734 S.W.2d at 807.
Wiser Oil Co. v. Conley, 346 S.W.2d 718 (Ky. 1961). Cf. Hi Hot Elkhorn Coal
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as a lessee, had a right to use the surface estate to extract coal
and utilize the timber necessary in its mining operations.3 6 Triv-
ette v. Consolidation Coal Co." illustrates the traditional ap-
proach Kentucky courts have taken regarding use of the surface
estate. In Trivette, Kentucky's highest court construed a mineral
and mining deed so as not to defeat its executed purpose. The
surface owners sought an injunction against the mineral owners
from building a power line to facilitate mining operations. 3 The
Trivette court held that even though the deed did not explicitly
grant the right to construct a power line, the language within
the deed granted such a right.3 9 However, the court noted that
the location of the power line must be reasonable with regard
to the rights and interests of the surface estate owners.4
Kentucky courts have found a trespass action to lie where a
negligent act is involved. In Com., Dept. of Highways v. Ra-
tliff,4 ' the court ruled that an action for trespass on real or
personal property shall be commenced within five years after
the cause of action occurs for damages to realty as a result of
negligence and is not limited in its application to technical tres-
pass.4 2 The court in Ratliff gave a broad interpretation to KRS
413.120(4)41 which provides a five-year limitation period to ac-
tions for trespass on real or personal property."4
In Ratliff, the state was barred from bringing a claim against
the driver and owner of a truck which damaged a highway bridge
due to the driver's negligence5.4  The state proposed that KRS
413.120(4) applied only to a technical trespass46 and not to a
Co. v. Kelly, 205 F.Supp. 764 (E.D. Ky. 1962)(in the absence of written agreement,
lessees cannot use surface owned by another in handling of coal).
6 Hatton, 734 S.W.2d at 807. However, the court indicated that the taking of
timber was limited to the terms of the deed. Id.
37 177 S.W.2d 868, 870 (Ky. 1944).
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id. Kentucky courts have recognized that a mineral owner's right to use the
surface must not be oppressive, arbitrary, wanton or malicious. Martin v. Kentucky Oak
Min. Co., 429 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. 1968)(Martin was overruled by Akers, 736 S.W.2d 294,
but not for the stated proposition); Elkhorn Coal Corp. v. Johnson, 249 S.W.2d 745
(Ky. 1952).
4- 392 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Ky. 1965).
-2 Id.
41 See supra note 11.
" Ratliff, 392 S.W.2d at 913.
45 Id.
" A "trespasser" is a person who enters or remains upon the land in possession
of another without the possessor's consent. Bradford, 379 S.W.2d 249.
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negligent act. 47 The Ratliff court found the state's plea unper-
suasive and applied KRS 413.120 because of its use in cases
involving actions for waste committed by a life tenant 8 and
claims for damages resulting from permanent nuisance.49
An argument could be fashioned that Falcon Coal's strip
mining of the Hatton property was negligent due to the destruc-
tion of Hatton's excepted trees. Furthermore, one can be negli-
gent even though no intent triggered the act. ° The Hatton opinion
gives no indication whether Falcon Coal intentionally caused the
subsequent harm. Based upon the Ratliff decision, Falcon Coal's
strip mining can be interpreted as a trespass to real property
based on a negligent act. However, Hatton appears distinguish-
able from Ratliff in that the former granted a right to use the
surface vis-a-vis restrictions5' whereas Ratliff involved no such
written instrument purporting such.52 Falcon Coal was negligent,
but its negligence arose from its violation of explicit terms es-
poused within the deeds.
Even if Hatton had brought an action within five years, he
could not have raised a claim for trespass against Falcon Coal
since it (Falcon Coal) had the right to use the surface as neces-
sary to accommodate mining of the coal.53 Furthermore, the
deed explicitly conveyed the right to use the surface in the mining
of coal.54 The Hatton court, relying upon the deed, found that
Falcon Coal was not a trespasser since Falcon Coal was entitled
to extract coal from the property and use the necessary timber
to facilitate its operations within the deed's terms."
In order to initiate a more viable cause of action as well as
one that would not be time barred, Hatton claimed a breach of
contract. A claim for breach of contract has a fifteen-year statute
of limitations.5 6 The deeds in question evidenced a contractual
obligation from which Hatton based its claim for breach of
explicit provisions excepting timber.
57
Ratliff, 392 S.W.2d at 913.
,8 Fisher's Ex'r v. Honey, 202 S.W. 495 (Ky. 1918).
49 West Virginia Gas Company v. Matny, 279 S.W.2d 805 (Ky. 1955).
Lebow, 394 S.W.2d 773.
' Hatton, 734 S.W.2d at 806.
5' Ratliff, 392 S.W.2d at 913.
See Trimble v. Kentucky River Coal Corp., 31 S.W.2d 367 (Ky. 1930); Rice
Bros. Mineral Corp. v. Talbott, 717 S.W.2d 515 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987).
14 See supra note 17.
15 Hatton, 734 S.W.2d at 806.
- KRS 413.090(2).
17 Hatton, 734 S.W.2d at 807.
[VOIL. 5:195
STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
III. VIOLATION OF A DEED'S TERMS AS A
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT
In Hatton, Falcon Coal claimed that the deed did not restrict
surface mining and indicated that the deed granted, "the full
and complete rights and privileges of every kind for mining,
manufacturing, and transporting such coal... on, and over said
premises."5 8 However, the deeds executed by the Whites in 1899
clarified their terms and provisions.59 This is significant since,
"[a] written contract within the fifteen-year statute of limitations
is one which is all in writing, so that all its terms and provisions
can be ascertained from the instrument itself.'' 6° The Hatton
court stated, "[t]he acceptance of a deed by the grantee makes
the deed a written contract.' '61 A number of states have recog-
nized a deed or the conditions therein to constitute a written
contract for statute of limitations purposes.
62
For example, in Washington v. Soria,63 the Supreme Court
of Mississippi held that the acceptance of a deed and the obli-
gations within did not fall within the statute of limitations for
an unwritten contract, either expressed or implied. 64 The high
court of Mississippi, enforcing an obligation for payment of
land, gave effect to the deed as a contract through its expressed
terms as well as upon its acceptance by the vendee.
65
An early Indiana case, Midland R. Co. v. Fisher,6 held that
the acceptance of a deed by the grantee makes it a written
contract within the statute of limitations. The Indiana Supreme
Court held that a covenant, requiring a railroad to erect a fence
in consideration for its right of way, ran with the land and was
enforceable as a contractual obligation acquiesced to by the
deed's acceptance. 67
11 Brief for Appellee, Falcon Coal, at 5, Hatton, 734 S.W.2d 806.
19 See supra note 17.
60 Mills v. McGaffee, 254 S.W.2d 716, 717 (Ky. 1953).
61 Hatton, 734 S.W.2d at 807. See 51 Am. Juit.2D Limitations of Actions § 97
(1970).
- Georgia, Ohio, Texas, Oklahoma and Utah are just a few. See Annotation,
What Constitutes a Contract in Writing Within Statute of Limitations, 3 A.L.R.2D 809,
832. "A deed or the recitals therein .. .constitute written contracts with respect to the
statute of limitations .... Id.
63 19 So. 485 (Miss. 1896). See Cleveland Trust Co. v. Elbrecht, 30 N.E.2d 433
(Ohio 1940).
" Soria, 19 So. at 485.
65 Id.
6 24 N.E. 756 (Ind. 1890).
6 Id.
1989-901
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Early Kentucky case law construed the provisions within a
deed to fall under the fifteen-year statute of limitations for breach
of contract. 6s In Louisville, H. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Baskett,69 the
court held the railroad company liable for breach of contract for
ignoring the covenant expressed within the deed. 70 The court, in a
second appeal of the same case, ruled that the covenant ran with
the land and was enforceable against the successor to the original
grantee.71 The Baskett covenant is analogous to Kycoga, lessor,
and Falcon Coal, lessee, since Falcon Coal breached the conditions
within the deed which ran with the land.
Where no allegation of fraud or mistake is alleged, an action
based on the construction of a writing is subject to the Kentucky
fifteen-year statute of limitations. 72 On the other hand, the five-
year statute of limitations applies in setting aside a deed if fraud
or mistake is alleged.73 The Hatton court did not address this
problem. 74
The court found that the explicit provisions within the deed
were not ambiguous. Specifically, the deed gave, "full right to
take and use all the timber (except walnut and poplar), under
14 inches in diameter, found on said premises required for any
of the above purposes .... ,,7" (emphasis supplied) Thus, the
court could not discern from the deed overwhelming mining
rights granting Falcon Coal a right to strip mine under a broad
form deed theory.
76
Under a broad form deed theory, 77 a mineral owner may use
a surface mining method, strip mining, to extract the mineral
without an express grant within a deed." Kentucky courts have
See Louisville H. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Baskett, 121 S.W. 957 (Ky. 1909); Elliot
v. Saufley, 11 S.W. 200 (Ky. 1889).
619 Baskett, 121 S.W. at 957.
70 Id. (the railroad failed to build a railroad station as consideration for a right
of way breaching the covenant within the deed).
7t Id.
72 Lafitte Co. v. United Fuel Gas Co., 177 F.Supp. 52 (E.D. Ky. 1959)(an action
concerning rights under a gas lease is a contract action where no allegation of fraud or
mistake exists).
71 Hollifield v. Blackburn, 170 S.W.2d 910 (Ky. 1943)(five year statute of limitation
applied where recording of deed disclosed grantee's fraud in securing it).
14 Hatton, 734 S.W.2d at 806.
11 See supra note 17.
76 Peabody Coal Co. v. Pasco, 452 F.2d 1126 (6th Cir. 1971)(federal court ac-
knowledged that some mineral deeds in Kentucky grant overwhelming mining rights).
See McFarland, 258 S.W.2d 3.
78 Kentucky "broad form deeds" are also known as "mayo" or "Northern" deeds.
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allowed the surface mining of coal where a deed does not express
restrictions concerning the mineral owner's rights on extracting
his mineral. 79 These rights, if exercised, must not be arbitrary,
wanton, or malicious.80
Some jurisdictions, however, prohibit strip mining unless
"the right to do so is made clear and expressed in terms so plain
as to admit of no doubt." ' 81 The Kentucky Constitution Section
19(2), known popularly as the "Broad Form Deed Amendment,"
dictates, in effect, that strip mining rights will not be found
under instruments that lack express terms and that were executed
before strip mining was known commercially in the Common-
wealth.
The reservation 82 in the Hatton deed disallowing the taking
of trees beyond a certain diameter and species did not explicitly
or even implicitly give Falcon Coal the right to strip mine under
the deed. Therefore, where no ambiguity exists in a deed, the
court must give effect to the language within the deed. 83 On the
other hand, courts do extend restrictive covenants by implication
or doubtful language. 84 As stated earlier, the Hatton deed's
language does not require any implication or extension.
Even though the deed did not prohibit strip mining in prac-
tice when the deed was executed, Kentucky law does not support
Falcon Coal's claim. When the express terms of a deed are
lawful, the parties must adhere to the restrictions placed on the
land's use.85 Accordingly, Falcon Coal was restricted to the terms
See Annotation, Grant, Reservation, or Lease of Minerals and Minning Rights as
Including, Without Expressly So Providing, the Right to Remove the Minerals by Surface
Mining, 70 A.L.R.3D 20(a) at 452 (1976).
'9 See Peabody Coal, 452 F.2d 1126; Rice v. Stapleton, 502 S.W.2d 522 (Ky.
1973).
0 Croley v. Round Mountain Coal Co., 374 S.W.2d 852, 854 (Ky. 1964). See
Martin, 429 S.W.2d 395; Buchanon v. Watson, 290 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1956). (Both Martin
and Buchanon were overruled by Akers v. Baldwin, 736 S.W.2d 294, but not for the
stated proposition).
', Smith v. Moore, 474 P.2d 794, 795 (Colo. 1970). See Commonwealth v. Fitz-
martin, 102 A.2d 893 (Pa. 1954); West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Strong, 42
S.E.2d 46 (W. Va. 1947).
12 See supra note 17.
Witten v. Damron, 187 S.W.2d 834, 836 (Ky. 1945).
See McFarland, 258 S.W.2d 3; Bishop v. Rueff, 619 S.W.2d 718 (Ky. Ct. App.
1981).
8, See Godley v. Kentucky Resources Corp., 640 F.2d 831, 835 (6th Cir. 1981)
(citing Phelps v. Sledd, 479 S.W.2d 894 (Ky. 1972); Inland Steel Co. v. Issacs, 291
S.W.2d 522 (Ky. 1956)(where an instrument conveying property is unambiguous, it must
be construed as to its terms).
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in the deeds.8 6 As stated by the Hatton court, "acceptance of a
deed by the grantee makes the deed a written contract. 87 By
strip mining, Falcon Coal violated the deed's (contract's) explicit
provisions.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals apparently found little dif-
ficulty in ascertaining that Falcon Coal was in breach of con-
tract.88 As defined, a breach is "the breaking or violating of a
law, right, obligation, engagement, or duty, either by commis-
sion or omission. [In addition, a breach] [e]xists where one party
to contract fails to carry out term, promise, or condition of the
contract."8 9 When comparing the actions of Falcon Coal against
the deed's restrictions, little effort is needed to construe a breach.
IV. CREASON V. SCOTT
The Kentucky Court of Appeals in Hatton cited only one
Kentucky case in their opinion. The court analogized Hatton to
Creason v. Scott, a case involving an executed coal lease. 9°
In Creason,91 a coal lease was executed by defendant land-
owners and others to Newman in March, 1945.92 A second lease
was executed in September, 1945 on the same land to one of the
defendant coal companies. 93 Newman, in December of 1945,
assigned a partial interest in his lease to Creason. 94 On September
10, 1947, Newman filed a claim against the defendants to have
his lease declared superior and to obtain an injunction. 95 Judg-
ment in favor of Newman was entered on October 6, 1951
invalidating the second lease and enjoining defendants from
interfering with Newman's use of the leased premises. 96
Seven years after the cause of action occurred, Creason
brought suit in court for a trespass, seeking damages for lost
profits from unmined coal from defendant landowners and their
IHatton, 734 S.W.2d at 807.
v Id.
uId.
19 BLACK'S LAW DICnTONARY 170 (5th ed. 1979).




" d. In 1946, the defendant companies took possession of the land and prevented
Newman from carrying on any mining operations. Id.




lessees. 97 The Creason court barred the claim under the five-year
statute of limitations.9" However, Creason had been evicted from
possession of the land when the defendant landowner leased the
property to another, therefore, he amended his petition to state
a new cause of action, against the defendant landowners, for a
breach of an implied warranty of quiet enjoyment an posses-
sion.99 Citing Evans v. Williams,10° the Creason court acknowl-
edged that such a covenant is implied in a lease of realty and is
based on a written contract for the land. 0 1 The action fell within
the fifteen-year limitation period under KRS 413.090102 since a
contractual action was before the court. 03
The Hatton court found significance in the Creason holding
since the plaintiff's cause of action was found to be a contractual
claim. °4 In effect, the terms of the lease in Creason were breached
as were the terms of the deed in Hatton.
CONCLUSION
The Hatton court reached two conclusions. First, the court
stated that, "[tihe obligations created by the deed
are.. .evidenced by a writing and are not governed by the lim-
itation respecting verbal contracts."'0 5 Secondly, Falcon Coal
did not trespass by strip mining the property.' °6
The lease, governed by the mineral severance deed, gave
Falcon Coal the inherent right to extract coal from the Hatton
property. However, Falcon Coal, by strip mining the property,
acted contrary to the deed's explicit provisions. In fact, Falcon
Coal's actions diametrically opposed the instrument's terms. The
resulting breach prompted the Hatton court to hold that the
fifteen-year statute of limitations for breach of contract ap-
plied. 107 Given the violation of the deed's (contract's) terms, the
application of KRS 413.090(2)10 was mandated.
97 Id.
% Id.
" Id. at 408.
-' Evans v. Williams, 165 S.W.2d 52 (Ky. 1942).
10, Creason, 275 S.W.2d at 408.
o2 See supra note 10.
13 Creason, 275 S.W.2d at 408.
104 Hatton, 734 S.W.2d at 807.
,01 Id. (citing 51 AM. JUR.2D Limitations of Actions § 97 (1970)).
" Hatton, 734 S.W.2d at 807.
" Id.
"o' See supra note 17.
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In summary, Hatton "highlights" two areas. First, a trespass
to real property does not occur when a rightful entry, pursuant
to a deed, results in a violation of a condition within that deed.
Secondly, the violation operates as a breach of contract since
acceptance of a deed constitutes a written contract. 1°9 The deci-
sion rendered by the Kentucky Court of Appeals is sound. The
fifteen-year statute of limitation for breach of contract embodies
the cause of action espoused within Hatton.
KELLY J. HOBBS
'1' See supra note 105.
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